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America
Has No Enemies
In Asia!
0

"Popular rumors from Asia are
very alarming . . . . Analyzed
and compared facts are not."
0
BY

RALPH TOWNSEND
Formerly of U. S. Consular Service
. in China. Author of Ways That Are
I
Dark and Asia Answers.
I

rice 15 Cents

IT IS unfortunate that we now have so many writers and speakers
telling us which side America should take in some foreign conflict,
and so few emphasiring the common sense of not taking any side.
IN THIS war-mongering, individuals employing the disguise of
certain "peace" organirations are tbe worst. It is a daily experience to note that when one of these " peace" speakers shows up to
discuss foreign trouble, he is careful to tell us just how to get into
it-on the side he favors-and not how to stay out of it altogether.
HEREWITH are a few facts of the sort average Americans sbould
know- and don't. They are commonly avoided by many editors
because organired publicity has made them unpopular.
IN PUBLISH ING this I am not affiliated with any organiration.
THE MOTIVE is not commercial. Since eye-opening observations in the Orient first interested me in that field, and disclosed
some of the chronic trickery of politics there repeatedly duping
Americans here, I have contributed a great deal of m y time without remuneration of any sort to the cause of judging Asiatic events
by specific facts rather than sensational publicity.
THIS BOOKLET is prompted by the favorable reception of a
previous one urging neutrality. Individuals and groups all over
America ordered copies for personal distribution or supplied costs
with lists of names to which copies were to be sent. I mailed
many at my own expense, and from patriotic recipients everywhere came orders for mailings to others. Such response from
persons in all businesses and professions, in all walks of life, testified to approval of sober facts rather than pretexts of bate-upon
neutrality rather tban partisanism-upon keeping needed trade
ratber tban futile boycotts for spite-upon a national policy of
sane defense rather than insane offense.

RALPH TOWNSEND.
San Francisco, September, 1938.

Photost ats of N . Y. Times items, 1929.

HOOVER AND STIMSON
SEEK CHINESE PEACE

SOVIET CANNOT
SEE STIMSON NOTE
AS AFRIENDLY ACT

Secretary Confers All Day With
Diplomats. but Admits We
Will Not Intervene.
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Litvinoff's Answer Charges
''Unjustifiable Pressure" and
Expresses "Amazement."

To Mobilize World Opinion i
Ending Sino-Soviet Crisis Is
Only Course, He Asserts.

RESENTS

"INTERFERENCE''

WAshington Astonished by the
Sharp Reply-Stimson at First
Qratified by Responses.

8p ecit1 l l '' Th e Nev.J Y o r k T irrLe s.

WASHINGTON .
Nov.
30. - Th e
Russo-Ch ines e cr is is in Man c hur ia
occupied the Int e n sive att ention o r
President H o ov e ~· and Sec r eta ry ·
Stimson todA y und er circumstan ces
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•• not a friendly aet.

StlmMn •lfpru~u gretlfi.,llllon ..t r.oponae of powera, but Ia allent OD
Soviet erltlci•m.

In 1929---

In 1929 Soviet troops entered Manchuria. There was
undeclared war between Chinese and Soviet armies. U. S.
Secretary of State Stimson timidly urged peaceful settlement. Comrade Litvinoff of the Soviet Union angrily told
him in diplomatic language that the war was not America's
business, to shut up, stop meddling. Friends of Soviets in
America put on mysterious pressure. Stimson hastily
backed down, saying he didn't mean to call any nation an
aggressor.
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"Russian forces mobilized on the
northern frontiers keep at least part
of Japan's army occupied," she said.
"Russian pressure brought on the
eague of Nations defining Japan
the aggressor nation has llkewi
asslllted to a cer tain exterrt."
Dr. Strong will lectur~ ~t Dream-

•--

When Soviets invaded Manchuria
and fought Chinese in 1929, U. S.
papers kept the affair rather hushed
up. Compare this with their violent
sensa tionalism two years later, in
193 1, when japanese fought in the
sa me a rea.

Famous Author-Lecturer Convinced
Ch iang Ka i-Shek W ill Win
Dr Anna ~be etronr. who up.t. Uon -.IUS muat proYe thtlr loylltJ
for the ~cklll(lttK)'" of eomunm.a.m t.o Ul• o. 8 . a . R. The rallb mutt
w-llh ponUfk:al wor&i, lectured on be Plllloed ot ~- COI'NP'\ poll..,
c:wnnt eve.nt. for t.he btntflt of • tktan.t. apka.
half~dum ne. . rtporkD cluat.tred
"ALL NATJONI T&O UBLED"
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Chtn.a'l trtnale4 battle for life.
Dr. 8 tronr torueu ultimate vtetorr
hmed for mon th&n a dleltk few Chin.l.
"CHIANG WfHNINO O trr
U tbe lloviel'a J:DOIL po\ent prapapDdllt, Dr. 8tron(. p.ueecl ~
" A numbfr of tact.Jona cooUnue
eooulh 1n her pt:roratloo. to dtellm to favw eap.ltu!aUon to Japan or
1 "~ or phllolophJ and compromise peace," abe ul.d, ''but
munkr."
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Kal-shtlfa rrowtnr prt'norill popu"h Ia rldlcuioua to uswr~e that larttr, evm In pro~s prevk1us1J
the ne• arreal.l lndle.ILI • trtmf'D- bOIWe to him."
dout upheaval aptn.t I!Jt.alfn end
Ruasla, 1M atd, Ia W~lltlnr China
tbe rovnnnwnt," 1h1 aid,
but that ~t.lnoc ~~ be pe~lv•

When the Soviets fought in Manchuria, the League didn't send a delegation to gather evidence-didn't
impl y anybody was an aggressor. It
hastened ro do both in the case of
j apan In 193 1-32. The same Litvinoff (k now n also as Finkelstein)
who told the U. S. to stop meddl ing
and shut up in 1929 cal led for League
and . S. condemnation of J apa n in
1937. Both the League and America
has tily obeyed.
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Red publicity and diplomatic machinery are strong
enough in America, Britain, and France to define the "aggressor" always in favor of Moscow. Above item hints how
League decisions are arranged. Chinese got no League or
U.S. backing when fighting Soviet reds-got plenty as soon
as they fought Jap~nese, who are anti-red.
[3l

Book at top was published by a leading
red writer in 1933. It pictures Chinese
civilians allegedly killed by Chiang Kaishek's party.
Chiang was fighting reds
then.
Book- at right published in 1938 typifies
new emphasis, though author of it is not
known as red writer. It pictures Chinese
civilians assumedly killed by Japanese. The
U. S. public is expected to forget that the
same charges now made against Japanese
Government were made against Chinese
Government prior to its present red alliance.

Different Emphasis
While Dictator Chiang Kai-shek of China fought
Chinese reds, who variously controlled about an eighth the
population of China, red writers in America reviled Chiang
as a fiendish butcher. As soon as Chiang made peace with
the reds and allied with them, publicity here began to
describe Chiang as a kindly, fatherly leader, horrified at
Japanese bombings.

r4

1

Soviet Aims
The Soviet Union has long sought control of China. It
has backed the Communist faction within China. Japan
opposes the prospect of a red China. This makes Japan an
enemy of the Soviet Union .'
The Soviet Union wants American aid against Japan.
This partly explains why reds were eager to see conflict between China and Japan. Such a war, it was hoped, would
ally America and Moscow. Warrant for this statement may
be found in writings of bolshevik leaders, too lengthy to
quote here.
Bear in mind that it was a Chinese Communist faction,
directly allied with Moscow, that kidnapped Chiang Kaishek to force him into war with Japan. Concerning this
bolshevik scheme to have America fight Japan for Moscow's
convenience, the following statement of red strategy is informing:
"Our salvation would be more readily assured if the
imperialist powers (meaning, in this case, America and
Japan) became embroiled in a war. If we are forced to
tolerate such scoundrels as the capitalistic thieves, each one
of whom is whetting his knife against us, then it is our immediate duty to turn these knives against each other."
-From the speech of Lenin to the Moscow unit leaders of the
Communist Party in Russia, Nov. 26, 1920. Collected Works of Lenin,

Vol. XXV.

Why any ally of Moscow, such as China, is always sensationalized in America as a victim of "aggression" is explained in the following statement of red philosophy:
"Every war which the Soviet League will wage will be
a defensive and a just war, regardless of whoever starts it."
-From the Soviet writer L. S. Diegtyarev, in his book, Political
Work in the Red Army, 1930, page 15.

[5]

The Soviet aim to get a "capitali st" nation as an ally
for convenience in attacking any opponent of the Soviet
Union is informingly set forth thus:
" . . . . we can form a military alliance with another
bourgeoisie (capitalist country), so that we can crush a third
bourgeoisie by means of this . . . . In this form of national
defence-a military alliance with bourgeois states, it is the
duty of the comrades in such a country to help this alliance
to victory."
-From a speech by Bukharin at the Fourth Wor ld Congress of
the Com intern, 1922, quoted in Red Militarism, by Peter Garwy, 1928.

The gentle kindliness of the Soviet theory, and the degree of sincerity in red publicity in America voicing pained
horror at J apanese bombings, may be esti mated from the
following:
"Revolution is founded on intimidation-it kills individuals, it intimidates thousands. Thus a conscious minority dynamically conve,rts itself into a majority by slaying its
main opponents and terrorizing the rest."
-From Leon Trotsky, former ly commander of the Soviet a rmies.
Quoted from page 191 of China in Revolution, by H. F. MacNair.
Recent statements by ruling Soviet officials show t hat such aims are
sti ll part of the Soviet creed.

From the plainest of evidence it is clear that reds do
not object to loss of life as such- they merely sensationalize
that which may aid in stirring resentment against their
enemies, and aid in gaining an American alliance against
anti-red nations on the pretext of fighting for "democracy."
The "democracy" the reds have in mind of course means the
Soviet variety.
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Photostat, N . Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1936.
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·LO ST TERRITORY SOUGHT

Seven Months Before W ar BrokeFor years before the present war Chinese reds constantly demanded that Dictator Chiang Kai-shek make war
on Japan. Moscow utterances meanwhile show leaders
there hoped for such a war.
U. S. papers rarely mention that it was Chinese reds,
allied with another faction, who kidnaped Chiang to fore~
him into war on Japan, threatening his life. The photostat
below, from the Voice of China, published in English in
Shanghai, shows the sentiment of pro-war Chinese. This
was published after the July 7, 1937, incident, but before
serious fighting began and while peace was still possible.
To stir hatred of Japan, U. S. papers avoid mentioning such
pro-war clamor in China, representing the Chinese as having done all possible for peace.
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Photostat of Sat. Eve. Post, issue of May 7, 1938.

Trade Facts
Of all the popular sensationalism promoting baseless
hatred and inviting trouble for us abroad, none better illu strates falsities to which ignorant or intentionally misleading
writers resort than the charge 1apan has "slammed the door"
against our products in areas of 1apanese control.
Typical is an article in the May 7, 1938, Saturday Evening Post by Carl Crow. Crow asserted 1apan has slammed
the door against U.S . products in Manchukuo, presenting a
horrifyi ng account of how our sales there a re declining.
Strangely-very strangely-Crow did not include specific figures on our sales there. Actually, U. S. Dept. of
Commerce tables show our sales in Manchukuo increased
at the time Crow says they fell. And nobody has accused
our Government of juggling figures to be pro-Japanese.
[8
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Bulletin No. 839 of t he U. S. D ept.
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SUMMARY

OF UNITED &'TAT&S TRADE
WITII WORLD, 1937

Eastern trade ve ry different from asse rti ons so oft en hea rd.

Page 36 of

t hi s accura tely co mpil ed bull etin , unive rsa lly accepted as co rrect, presents
fi gures whi ch ref ute hate-s tirrin g se nsa ti o nalism such as in th e Sa turday
Evening Pos t a rticle show n o pposite.

Sales of U. S. goods in Manchukuo increased by about
a fourth from 1933 to 1934-right after japan's occupation.
In 1935 our trade slumped all over that part of continental
Asia. But it slumped only 29 per cent in japanese-controlled
Manchukuo, while slumping 44 per cent in China, where there
was no japanese control.
From 1936 to 1937 our trade gained 6 per cent in
China. But in Manchukuo it gained 353 per cent-fiftyeight times as much as in China. Our 1937 sales in Manchukuo more than doubled our 4-ye.ar average from 1926-30
there, when Manchukuo was under Chinese war chief rule,
and which was a boom period for U. S. exports.

If the Japanese are. bent on "slamming the door" against
our products, it is strange they have not done so long ago
in Japan, where their privilege has never been questioned.
Instead, Japan ranks as our third largest customer, buying
about six times as much from us as China buys.

Photostat, N. Y. Times item, telli ng of a celebration in New York of
the Revoluti on in Ru ssia, which occurred Mar. 14, 1917. j acob Schiff of
Kuhn-Loeb & Co. a rranged a loa n to help j apan fight Russia in 1904-05,
when Russia was und er Czarist rule.
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Not Suspected at the Time
In 1904-05 U. 5. papers lavishly favored Japan. Many
Americans didn't know then that such press praise for Japan was
partly stirred by organized forces here working for revolution m
Russia. Above item appeared 12 years later, in 1917.
Backing Japan to defeat the Czar from without aided revolutionaries seeking his overthrow f rom within . Such facts show how
newspaper ca mpaign s of hate or praise may be influenced by interests
not suspected at the time. U. S. papers on the whole favored J apan
as long as J apan opposed Cza ri st Russia, but turned anti-Japanese
after 1917 when Japan became a potential enemy of revolutionary
Russia.
[ 10]

America's Legal Position
Except as an educational interest in an important event
of our time, the question of who started the present war in
China is not legally or logically our concern.
Whichever side was the aggressor in China, neither side
is aggressing against us. That is the important point.
Our obligation to remain neutral is exactly the same
under international law, whether blam~ for the war lies
mainly with China or with Japan.

Agitator Deceptions
Organized groups seeking to embroil us abroad have
created much confusion on this point.
They refer glibly to the Nine Power Treaty and the Kellogg Treaty, without quoting the exact texts. They have
thus generated the notion that these agreements call upon
America to intervene against "aggressor" nations.
There is nothing in either agreement to define an "aggressor." Nor is there any reference to hostile action by
signers even if the "aggressor" could be otherwise defined.
On the contrary, the very clear aim of the Kellogg Pact
is to limit the scope of a war if one should occur- not to
spread it by dragging in nations not originally involved.
The Nine Power Treaty, which deals with China, says
nothing about aiding the Chinese if they are involved in war.
It is not a military alliance.

Our Treaties for Peace Only
No known treaty to which America is a party commits
us to take sides in foreign conflicts.
Every established principle of our foreign relations prescribes for us a course of strict neutrality when we are not
attacked and when no nation of this hemisphere is attacked
from without.
[II ]

The Kellogg Treaty
Here is the wording of the two significant portions of
the Kellogg Treaty of 1928, exactly as obtained from our
Department of State :
"A RTICLE I
"The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the
names of their respective peoples that they condemn
recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national
policy in their relations with one another.
"ARTICLE II
"The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever
nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may
arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific
means."

Are these words foreign propaganda?
Our war agitators invariably refer to anything which
points out the common sense and legality of our neutrality
as "fo reign propaganda."

If the text quoted is foreign propaganda, remember that
it came from our own Department of State, that it was
endorsed by our government, and that it has been reaffirmed
by every President of the United States since America signed
it.
Remaining portions of the treaty, those not quoted here,
deal only with methods of ratification , where copies shall be
kept, etc. America and a few other nations signed the treaty
on August 27, 1928. Later it was signed by governments of
practically all the civilized and sem i-civilized world. China
and the Soviet Union signed it.
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Four Points to Note
( 1)

The Kellogg Treaty does not mention the Orient.

(2) It does not make us the supposed guardian of
China or any other backward country.
(3) It does not involve us in the disputes of other nations. We did not promise to intervene if others should fight.
We did not guarantee what others would do or not do.
( 4) America's signature on the Kellogg Treaty spoke
for America only. We simply said we would not go to war
if we could stay out of war. That was all.

Making America an Aggressor
America's Kellogg Treaty promise has been kept. T here
is no reason why America should not continue to keep it. No
nation is molesting us.
Any nation which goes to war or intervenes with pressure when not attacked is an aggressor nation.
Eager to aid foreign factions they favor by dragging
in America, agitators scheme to convert what are now local
wars into a World War.
That is one of the things the Kellogg Treaty was designed to prevent.
Shouting about violations of the Kellogg Treaty by
others, agitators seek to twist its meaning to have America
become a violator.

Partisanism Dangerous
Any partisan action on the part of America, regardless
of which foreign faction may be aided or opposed, is in direct
violation of the moral and legal status of American neutrality.
[ 13]

It is in direct defiance of the wish for peace by the overwhelming majority of Americans.
Partisanism in foreign wars is not defensive action.
is looking for trouble-crossing oceans to find trouble.

It

Who's W ho A mong Agitators
Notice that agitation to involve us abroad is always
aimed at getting our help for one of the allies of Moscow.
China is allied with the Soviet Union. So is the MadridBarcelona faction in Spain.
Every outstanding organization agitating for American
intervention or partisanism is controlled by known sympathizers with Moscow. This can be proved by checking the
background of ringleaders.
Misuse of words has become so general that anything
advertised fl.S a peace talk is almost certain to be an argument
for America to meddle in some distant war. Anything
labelled as a plea for tolerance is equally certain to be a blast
of warlike hatred against one of the nations which Reds
don't control and which Reds want America to help crush.
Check this next time you turn on the radio to hear a
"peace" plea or a "tolerance" plea.

Ra rely
Mentioned . . .
Sensational papers seeki ng t rouble
with J apan by ta lk of territo rial aggression a re ca reful not to mention
the Soviet Uni on's 1923 seizure of
M ongoli a, a huge a rea of Chinese
territo ry. The Sovi ets still ha ve it.

[ 14]

The Nine Power Treaty
Besides misrepresenting the Kellogg Treaty agitators
seeking to embroil us in Asia refer with equally obvious deceptions to the Nine Power Treaty.
The Nine Power Treaty was signed Feb. 5, 1922, by
America, Belgium, Britain, China, France, Italy, Japan,
Holland, and Portugal. It deals particularly with China,
but not in the way that agitators claim.

Here are the significant portions of the Nine Power
Treaty in the exact text received from our Department of
State:
"ARTICLE I
"The Contracting Powers, other than China, agree:
" (1) To respect the sovereignty, the independence,
and the territorial and administrative integrity of
China;
"(2 ) To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government;
" ( 3) To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of
equal opportunity for the commerce and industry
of all nations throughout the territory of China;
" (4) To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or
citizens of friendly States, and from countenancing
action inimical to the security of such States."

Points to Note
In signing this treaty, America did not guarantee China's
territory or anything else in China.
We said what WE would do, which was to respect
China's territory. This we have done. We did not guarantee
what OTHER NATIONS would do.
f15]

Writers even in what the public considers "reliable"
magazines, such as the Atlantic Monthly, have persistently
misrepresented this important point. They refer to our
"guarantee" of China's territory . The word guarantee does
not appear in the Nine Power Treaty, nor is it in any way
implied.

Our Promise to Discuss
Only one reference appears in the Nine Power Treaty
to action in the event violations should be charged. Each
signer promised to discuss the matter-that is all. The exact
wording is as follows:
"ARTICLE VII
"The Contracting Powers agree that, whenever a situation arises which in the opinion of any one of them
involves the application of the stipulations of the present
Treaty, and renders desirable discussion of such applica·
tion, there shall be full and frank communication between the Contracting Powers concerned."

Notice that the text says there shall be "frank communication" between signers. "Frank communication" is
a long jump from armed intervention or warlike boycotts.

Our Promise Kept
America promised to discuss matters if any government
accused another of violating the Nine Power Treaty. Nobody can say we failed to keep that promise. We have had
discussion and almost nothing else but.
With thousands of barrels of ink used for sensational
articles about our Nine Power Treaty obligations, it is unfortunate that so few publications have seen fit to quote the
exact words of that treaty.
Quoting it correctly would not serve the publicity aims
of those who want to see America embroiled in Asia.
[ 16]

Who Wanted the China War?
As previously emphasized, America's legal position respecti ng the war in China i the same, regardless of which
side was the aggressor.
There is no more justification for us to be involved in
the present strife between China and Japan than in the late
war between Bolivia and Paraguay.
For us, as neutral spectators, the question of who started
the China war has been sensationalized out of all proportion
to its proper significance.
Legally, the question has no significance for America.
We are not the world's judge, jury, or umpire.

But because of the publicity emphasis given the "aggressor issue", an inquiry into evidence is in order. The
purpose of such an inquiry here is not to show that this or
that nation was responsible for the conflict. Rather, the purpose is to show the difference between rumors and realities,
and thereby call attention to some of the absurdities of agitators now see king to invol ve America.

Opinions Abundant-Facts Scarce
Much of what has been asserted by popular writers
about the China: war can not be proved at all, and has no
basis of reputable testimony.
Some of the commonest statements heard daily from
promine.n t people are known by every careful investigator
to be untrue.

Conservative investigators are not ashamed to say "We
don't know" when queried on variou points. As in the case
of the World War, full information on various points may
not be available until long after the strife. Violent positiveness at this time is rather a mark of ignorance or dishonest
propaganda than of knowledge and sin cerity.
[ 17]

Demand for Sensationalism
A modern war is always a product of many complex influences. Foreign intrigues, secret treaties, secret assurances
in return for outside aid, factional ambitions- all may be
operative.
The mob mind can not sort and evaluate complex evidence. It wants issues summed up in one or two sentences,
with all blame on one side and all right on the other. Circulation demands of modern newspapers and magazines have
increased the market for sensational and inaccurate writing.
Qualified scholars will not stoop to it.

Front Rank Men Seld om Heard
Far Eastern specialists of the front rank rating of Payson Treat, Herbert Gowen , J. 0. P. Bland, W . E. Soothill, A.
E. Hindmarsh, E. T. Williams, H. F. MacNair, Sir Reginald
Johnston, H. G. W . Woodhead, K. S. Latourette, Paul Clyde
and a dozen or so others have seldom been wanted as contributors to popular publications.
Such men aim at accuracy, not lurid excitement. They
emphasize facts, not opinions. Their personal sympathies
may lie with China or with Japan. But they are awar~ of
too many pros and ~ons to permit broadside barrages of hate
toward either.

To such men, the present war in China is a supreme
tragedy for both belligerents, not an occasion for rabble jeers
and campaigns of hate by those of us who happen to be more
fortunate just now.
Neither the Chinese nor Japanese are fighting for fun .
Hundreds of thousands of men, whatever their nationality,
do not endure all manner of agonies and die in the mud for
the tritely asserted causes so often voiced as "expert analysis." It is as impossible to sum up the issues of t he China
war in a sentence or two as to do so with the American Civil
War or any other great human upheaval.
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What is Now Known
No detailed, authoritative work on causes of the present
China war, with apparently unprejudiced inquiry into grievances of both Chinese and Japanese, has as yet appeared.
Only main features of evidence can be outlined here.
Facts will be kept strictly separate from sentiment, rumors
and opinions.

Did Chiang Kai-Shek Want War?
Accusers of Chiang make these charges :
(1) Years before the fighting of 1931-32 in Manchuria, China under Chiang's dictatorship acquired the largest
standing army on earth, numbering between 2,000,000 and
2,500,000 men.

(2) Chiang made anti-Japanism the basis of uniting
under him China's various "private" armies.
( 3) Instead of accepting in a conciliatory spirit Japan's
withdrawal of troops from Suiyuan and other friendly gestures early in 1937, Chiang intensified his anti-Japanese
program, believing Japan to be weakening.
( 4) Chiang fostered such anti-Japanese socie.t ies as
the Blue Shirts, a secret society composed largely of Chinese
officers sworn to oppose Japan at all hazards, whatever Japan
might do toward conciliation.
(5) Prominent Chinese, such as Wang Ching-wei,
who advocated a policy of peace and friendly co-operation
with Japan, were killed or injured by Chinese groups which
Chiang did not suppress and which seemed to have Chiang's
sanction.
( 6) Immediately preceding conflict last summer,
Chine,se troops entered and began to fortify the zone bordering the Japanese area of Shanghai. By an agreement of
1932, this zone was to remain demilitarized.
[ 19]

(7) Serious fighting last summer began in two areas
where Chinese troops had no right under treaties to be-on
the north side of Shanghai and at Tientsin.
(8) Chiang overruled the efforts of local Chinese officials to effect a peaceful settlement of the original July 7
skirmish in North China.
( 9) Chiang mobilized China's troops on a large scale
at a time when Japan was offering no threat of war, and was
attempting peaceful settlement.
(Comments on these charges will be offered presently by the writer
of this booklet.)

Did Japan Want War?
Accusers of J apan make t hese charges:
( 1 ) That the Japanese are a war-mad people, longing
to conquer the world, and desire to make China the first step
in this obje.c tive.
(2) That Japan's annexation of Korea in 1910 and
military aid in the establishment of the Manchukuo government, 1931-32, prove Japan's aims.
( 3) That the Japanese government is actuated by a
program set forth in what is called the Tanaka Memorial, a
memorandum of Japan's avenue of conquest allegedly submitted to the Emperor years ago.
( 4) That Japan without provocation attacked in
China in the summer of 1937 because of the fear that China
might become stronger if Japan waited, and also because of
the belief that England and the Soviet Union were then unable to come to China's aid because of European affairs.
( 5) That a sort of religious fervor has been so cultivated in Japan, with military emphasis, that average Japanese
are burning with the desire to die for Japan in wars against
all the rest of creation.
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{6) That there is a military dictatorship in Japan to
which the general population is in subjection, and that this
military clique drags the rest of the people into war at will.
( 7) That leading Japanese financiers and industrialists
are in league with the Japanese military commanders in
order to conquer new territory for "slave, labor", supplies,
and marketS.
(Comments on tbese cbarges will be offered presently by tbe writer
of tbis booklet.)

Did Chiang Want War?
Tbe following are comments by tbe autbor of tbis booklet:

China's Army Totals
It is correct to say that China's armies during years
prior to the present war in China were the largest in the
world. Mr. Hallett Abend, long New York Times correspondent in China, with an exceptional record of accuracy,
quoted 2,500,000 as the total of China's troops in the year
1930. This figure appears on page 65 of his book, Tortured
China.
Mr. H. G. W. Woodhead, Editor of the China Year
Book, is likewise conservatively careful. On page 242 of his
Adventures in Far Eastern Journalism, published in 1935, he
estimated the total of China's troops at 2,250,000. Differences in estimates arise partly because some of the Chinese
troops have recurrently deserted t he army for a time to
operate as bandits, then rejoined.
P ossibly t he earlier estimates included t he "private
army" of Chang Hsueh-liang, who ruled Manchuria practically independent of China before the J apanese occupation.
Professor A. E. Hindmarsh of Harvard states that t he army
of "independent" Manchuria numbered 350,000 men in 1928.
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China's Wa r Supplies
Writers in the San Francisco Chronicle and similar publications have declared that China is without arsenals for
t he manufacture of weapons. The 1933 China Year Book,
pages 544-46, gives a list two pages long of Chinese arsenals
at that time, five years ago. As far back as 1909 the Encyclopaedia Britannica listed six arsenals of importance in China,
some capable even then of turning out heavy guns.
Every standard work of referehce gives similar information for writers and speakers who might by chance wish to
offer facts, rather than pursue the usual course of concealing
t hem.
Before the Japanese took Mukden in 193 1, the Chinese
arsenal there ranked as one of the largest in the world, reputedly employing at its peak some 20,000 men, including
many foreign technicians. Such facts are familiar to every
informed student of the Far East. Newspapers commonly
avoid such facts . The vogue is to picture the Chinese as
fighting with little better than sticks and ancient swords.
Just before the present conflict began, red publications

in both America and China carried awesome accounts of
China's military might. They claimed China was ready to
fight Japan, that China could win, and stated they would
like to see the war start at once. But the minute it began
the same organizations launched publicity picturing China
as a quaintly peaceful nation, totally unprepared, pounced
upon without warning by a tremendously armed foe.

By the plainest of evidence it is apparent that China
actually spent far more on armies between 1927 and 1937
than did Japan. 1t would have been impossible to equip
more t han two million soldiers with the quality of arms and
munitions to be seen everywhere in China without spending
far more than Japan, whose regular troops numbered only
one ninth as many as China's.

No Proof of Blame
That China has led the world in militarism, both in
numbers of troops and in proportions of taxes diverted to
military purposes, is not open to intelligent dispute.
But China's excessive militarism is not in itself proof
that Chiang Kai-shek, China's Dictator, was planning all
along to attack Japan. In the interest of fairness, there is
need of strict separation between surmise and evidence.

Chiang did not create China's colossal militarism. He
inherited it. When he became dictator in 1927, various military chiefs ruled sections of China as their own domains .
Each had his huge army. Chiang improved his own army
till it was the best in China. A deadlock ensued. Chiang
could not prudently disband his own army in the face of rival
threats. Nor could he coerce others into disbanding without
renewing civil wars. Nobody trusted anybody else, for the
excellent reason that in preceding years practically everybody in China had betrayed everybody else.

Chiang's Unification
Unable to disband these millions of armed men, assuming that he wished to, Chiang set about unifying them under
his central regime.

In his unification methods Chiang is open to criticism.
From the first anti-foreignism was the main creed of his
party. On his way to power, Chiang's anti-foreignism was
mainly anti-American and anti-British. When his armies
took Nanking in March of 1927, his soldiers under Chinese
officers went from one foreign consulate to another, and from
one foreign home to another, killing, torturing, plundering.
The British Consul was shot point blank in his own yard.
Mr. J. K. Davis, the American Consul, narrowly escaped wjth
his life.
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Anti-Americanism
Numerous Americans who lived through those days in
China lost mothers, sisters, fathers or brothers in killings
which resulted from openly proclaimed Chinese official
policy.*
The same Chiang Kai-shek group which perpetrated this
program of anti-American killings and property destruction
is now shouting its friendship for America to get our aid
against Japan .
There was no valid excuse for this 1927 campaign to
drive Americans from China. Our residents there were in
legitimate business. Most of them were ih philanthropic
work- maintaining schools and hospitals-to which wealthy
Chinese usually give nothing. Americans had donated more
than 80 million dollars in American money for hospitals and
schools, and were giving from five to ten million dollars annually to support these.
Our total of residents in China was only about an eighth
the total of Chinese residing in America. America had always befriended China. We had never taken a single acre
of territory there. So far as this writer can learn we had no
mining or railway concessions. American influence had saved
China from being parcelled out among European powers
back in the 19th century. America had given back indemnity
money levied on China after the massacres of 1900 when the
Chinese Government had ordered all Americans and. other
foreigners in China slain.

Chinese Politics
For decades in Chi.na it has been the fashion to blame
foreigners for the distress brought on partly by overpopulation and partly by Chinese civil wars and official cruelties.
• Consult Tortured China, 1930, by Hallett Abend, N. Y. Times correspondent in China; also Within the Walls of Nanking by Alice Tisdale Hobart,
later author of Oil for the Lamps of Cbina ; and Ways Tbat Are Dark-Tbe
Truth About China, by Ralph Townsend, 1933.
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Probably less than five per cent of China's population can
read, though the number of Chinese graduates of American
universities is large. Mass ignorance makes anti-foreign ism
a natural choice of corrupt politicians.
After America and England bombarded Nanking to
rescue foreigners and showed a firm resolve to defe nd the
Shanghai Settlement, Chiang's party found that anti-American and anti-British policies did not pay. So Chiang's party
moderated that tack and began to seek U. S. aid. Chiang
wanted aid to help him subdue rival claimants for the dictatorship. He promptly got U. S. backing, for reasons too
devious to relate here, despite just having finished a campaign of anti-Americanism in which much American property
was burned and in which a number of Americans were killed.
When U. S. and British backing became assured, Chiang's party shifted the anti-foreign emphasis to Japan. The
Anglo-Japanese alliance had expired. Bolshevist publicity
against Japan had been effective in America. Thus isolated, at that time not having either Italy or Germany as
theoretical allies, Japan was the ideal target-much better
than America or England- for traditional Chinese antiforeignism.

China's Anti-Jap an Campaign
It seems to this writer that there was no justification for
the new anti-Japan policy in China. Chinese businessmen
by the thousands were well-treated in Japan. At that time
Japan had not occupied Manchukuo, then called Manchuria.
Japan in 1922 had voluntarily handed back to China
the former German concessions of railways, etc., in the
Chinese province of Shantung, which Japan had taken from
Germany in the World War. Japan's re.turn to China of
these properties was a generous gesture, very exceptional in
the history of international dealings. It was particularly
significant on the part of Japan, which is a relatively poor
country and in need of outside resources.
(25]

Just why the Japanese returned the Shantung properties
to China, this writer can not say. Japanese papers at the
time were full of arguments that Japan should take the lead
in cultivating Chinese good will, and thus open trade relations with China which would be more valuable than the
Shantung concessions. This sentiment seems to have been
strong, for a little later, in 1929, the Japanese Government
appropriated 72 million yen to establish scholarships for
Chinese students to study in Japan as "good will" guests.
Also, the Japanese opened a number of good will hospitals
in China, financed in Japan, for the benefit of poorer classes
of Chinese.
Certainly the anti-Japanese campaign in China did not
originate with the. Japanese occupation of Manchuria. It was
provably under way years before that event.

The Manchurian Conflict
During the Japanese conflict with Chinese in Manchuria,
between- 1931 and 1933, Chiang Kai-shek never once took
the field against the Japanese. That conflict was largely
between the Japanese and Chang Hsueh-liang, war chief who
ruled Manchuria as his own province, independent of Chiang's regime in China Proper.
Japan's investments in Manchuria, consisting mainly of
the South Manchuria Railway, had begun early in the present
century. Enlightened Chinese then were appealing for
foreign capital and technical talent to develop the country.
There was nothing illegal in such investments. American
capital was being invested in Canada and elsewhere. I nvestors in China did not then foresee the long period of Chinese
civil wars which would devastate the country and make the
masses ripe for anti-foreign policies by Chinese politicians.
Japan's return of the Shantung concessions to China and
other good will gestures may have placated some of the better elements in China. But they failed to halt the antiforeignism which was the main political expedient of many
f26]

Chinese polit icians and rac keteers. T he failure of Chinese
officials to halt anti-J apanese campaigns, often res ulting in
violence, aroused bitterness in J apan, comi ng as t hey did on
top of J apanese good will gestu res which had meant considerab le sacrifices to J apan.
Anti-] apanese agitators in China did not propose to buy
Japanese properties. T heir slogans called for confiscation.
The Lytton Commission, not favorable to Japan, nevertheless listed more provocations endured by the Japanese
before going to war in Manchukuo in 1931 than we endured
before fighting Spain in 1898 or Germany in 1917.

The precipitating incident of September 18, 193 1, was
trivial. Insight into preceding irritations may be gained
from the Lytton Report, particularly the Supplement to it.
Comparisons

When the Chinese launched an official program of killing Americans and other foreig ners in 1900, we fo ught back
with troops sent to China. We fought back until the Chinese
agreed to peace and guarantees against such outrages in the
future .
When the Chinese repeated their official program of killing Americans and other foreigners in 1927, when Chiang
Kai-shek first came into power, we again sent troops to
China and fought back. We fought back until the Chinese
officially took steps to halt such outrages against our citizens
ther«;. This course was in accord with what successive
American presidents have defined as our obligation to insist
on respect for civilized principles.

It is hardly logical for us to be so severely critical of
the Japanese for fig hting now as a result of conditions which
caused America to fight in China on two occasions within
the last 38 years.
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The magnitude of military operations is far greater in
the warfare in China now. But the principle involved in
provocations leading up to the conflict is the same as that
when America fought in China in 1900 and in 1927.
Anti-Japanese Violence

It is common ly supposed by uninformed Americans t hat
anti-J apanese agitation in China, during years preceding t he
present conflict, was a matter of boycotts and press criticism.
It was not. The writer of this booklet offers an illustrative
instance of which he had direct knowledge:
In Foochow, a South China city, there, were some hundreds of Japanese. They were there as tea buyers, wholesalers, and other legitimate occupations, entitled to the same
protection Chinese business men received in Japan. In one
house lived a Japanese school teacher and his wife.
Chinese secret societies threatened the life of the school
te.a cher-not, so far as any one could learn, on complaints
that he had committed any offense-but because it was
planned to kill him as a demonstration of "Chinese patriotism." The Japanese Consul asked the Chine.s e officials
to provide guards for the teacher's home. Chinese guards
were sent.
A few days later, mysteriously, the guards suddenly left
their posts without notice. At once a gang of "Chinese
patriots" burst into the home and shot both the Japanese
teacher and his wife. In this case, the charge of the Japanese
was not that the Chinese officials had ordered the killings,
but that they had connived at it or permitted it by abr.uptly
withdrawing the guards without notice at a time when it
was known a gang contemplated the crime.
Chiang's Predicament

Anti-Japanese agitation from 1928 to 1937 was waged
considerably by Chinese elements - particularly Chinese
[28]

Chinese and Japanese at dedication of a new Japanese hospital in
China, attended by the writer of this booklet, then in the American
Consu lar Service. Between 1929 and 1936 Japan donated a number
of hospitals to China, also opened clinics for poor Chinese, all as part
of a policy to gain Chinese good will. In all , Japan's po licy toward
China has probably been as creditable as the average of other nations.

Comm unists-who hated Chiang. If he coul d be entangled
in a losing war, reds might hope to gain power in large areas
of Chin a in consequence of wartime disorganization.
When Chiang Kai-shek undertook to subdue anti-Japanese lawlessness, his enemies in China shoute.d that he was
pro-Japanese. Yet to compromise with the anti-Japanese
elements and officially sanction their violence would invite
war with Japan. Chiang was in a hard position. Finally
he yielded to the factions clamoring for war.
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In June of 1936 a South Chin a taction revolted with t he
announcement t hat its aim was to fo rce Chi ang to attac k the
J apanese. T hen in December of 1936 t he C hinese Communi st s, in an alli ance with another fact ion, kidn apped Chiang a nd announced he would be killed unless he ag reed to
war on J apan. War came seven mont hs later.
The point is not that Chiang Kai-shek himself provoked
the present war. But it is a matter of plain evidence that
provocations from the Chinese side were numerous.

Chiang's Kidnaping
F rom Madame Chiang Kai-shek's book on t he kidnaping of her hu sband, plus other evidence, it seems plain t hat
Chiang had to choose between risk ing his dictato rshi p in civil
war or join ing the movement to make war on J apan. T he
Blue Shirts, an organization of anti-J apanese officers in the
Chinese army, might join the factions against him if he
refused to side with the factions seeking war on Japan.
Chinese businessmen and the more stable variety of
educated Chinese generally seem to have opposed war. The
common coolie and farmer classes dreaded war. But these
pro-peace elements were shouted down by the radicals.

Meanwhile, red propagandists spread the word t hat aid
from America could be expected if war could be started.
While affairs were thickening, after Chiang was kidnaped by reds in December of 1936, Chinese radicals were
shouting that China, with nine times as many ready troops,
could win against Japan.
When Conflict Came

Probably no foreigner knows positively who began the
shooting on the night of July 7, 1937. This was in itself
unimportant. It became serious when the Chiang Kai-shek
central government of China, under pressure from p ro-war
elements, refused to recognize t he negotiations of local
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Chinese officials at the scene of the incident . The local officia ls seemed ready to settle it peacefully . Chinese radicals
in Nanking and Shanghai were shouting t hat t he local officials were sell-outs to J apan, and t hat Chiang should not
accept t hei r settlement. T hi s meant war.
Treaty Provisions

It is correct to say t hat serious fig hting began in two
places where Chinese troops under existing treaties had no
legal right to be. T he two places were T ientsin and North
Shanghai.
The treaty whereby Chinese were not to move armies
into certain areas near Tientsin was not an agreement between China and Japan alone, but between China and several
powers, including America. This treaty dates back to the
settlement of the Boxer massacres of 1900. Foreign powers
insisted on keeping the route from Peking to the sea always
open for foreigners to leave in times of danger.
Evidence of V iolations

The agreement providing that China was not to move
troops within a certain distance of the Japanese occupied
corner of Shanghai was an agreement between China and
J apan alone. It dates back to I 932, when the Japanese agreed
to withdraw troops after the battle of Shanghai if the Chinese
would agree to keep soldiers away from the zone just north
of t he city where t hey wou ld menace Japanese civilian residents. So many massacres of foreigners have occurred in
the past when ignorant Chinese soldiers suddenly ran amuck
t hat t he J apanese insisted on t hat arrangement. American
and Brit ish officials signed the agreement as witnesses.
Photographs published in American newspapers of the
early fighting at Tientsin and Shanghai, while published with
hotly anti-Japanese captions, nevertheless showed that the
warfare began in areas where China had agreed not to move
troops.
[3 1]

Civilian Killings at Tungchow
What roused Japan more than anything else after the
July 7, 1937, affair, was news of the slaughter at Tungchow,
near Peiping, of some 200 Japanese subject&--men, women,
and infants. American papers gave this e,v ent either very
obscure notice or no notice at all, though it was of great importance in launching the war.

The Tungchow massacre was perpetrated by Chinese
soldiers apparently excited by reports that the Japanese had
been routed and were in retreat from China. Tungchow was
not a theatre of conflict, and the Japanese families there were
set upon without warning and slain . Indignation among
Japanese in Japan ran high, and from that time on-] uly 29
-a full size war with China was considered inevitable.
Points of Law

From the standpoint of international law, the Chinese
case in respect to origins of the war is not very good.
When serious fighting began the
were where. they had a legal right under
Chine.s e soldiers at the same time were
have a legal right under the treaties to

Japanese garrisons
treaties to be. The
where they did not
be.

So far as this writer has learned, not a sing le American
newspaper or magazine has so much as mentioned this paramount consideration in all the millions of words printed in
regard to the war.
Omissions of all reference to a point so vital in the question of war guilt indicates something gravely missing in the
alleged honesty of American journalism.
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Defining the Aggressor

The League of Nations sessions at which J apan was
called the aggressor were dominated by Soviet Commissar
Maxim Litvinoff, known also as Finke lstein. He dominated
the Brussels Conference likewise.
Note that no group sent a delegation to gather evidence
on causes of the. conflict. Such would have put on paper
evidence which the Moscow ring against Japan very much
wanted to keep off paper.

The League blundered badly in 1931 when it sent out
the Lytton Commission to gather facts. The Lytton Commission findings showed an embarrassing array of Chinese
provocations. The League didn't make that mistake again
in 1937. Directed by Comrade Litvinoff it took action for
China, Moscow's al ly, without any inquiry-a procedure as
high-handed as would be a judgment without evidence in an
ordinary court case.
League pronouncements are important for publicity effects. They impress persons who suppose the League an
impartial body-unaware that every government instructs
its League delegates according to its own schemes. Under
such conditions there can be no disinterested verdict.

League publicity to sensationalize China as a victim
of aggression was backed in America by publicity to picture
the Chinese as particularly peaceful people. This was
hardly in accord with the evidence. For decades the Chinese
have fought constantly among themselves . As a nation
they have never shown ability either to get on with others
or even to get on with one another. Rated by frequency
of civil wars and totals of slaughter, China's record is one
of the bloodiest known to history. By specific comparison,
past or present, China's record is far more strife-ridden than
Japan's.
[33]

The Odd Spectacle

Thus we have an odd spectacle. A nation experienced
two revolts within six months to force its government into
war. Its dictator was kidnapped and held prisoner to force
him into an agreement for war. Its soldiers were on demilitarized ground when war began. For years its radical
students paraded constantly with banners calling for war.
Its politicians who advocated peace were beaten or shot.
But that nation, China, when it finally got the war its radical
factions clamored for, was declared by organized pro-red
publicity in America to have been jumped on without provocation.

Did Japan Want War?
Japan's Army

Standard American references list the total of Japan's
regular army just prior to present hostilities at 257,000 men.
Thus Japan's standing army strength was about oneninth of China's standing army strength. According to Walter Duranty, N. Y. Times correspondent, the Soviet Union
as far back as 1936 had 400,000 troops stationed in the Vladivostok area, fronting on Japan's Korean border. Elsewhere,
according to the Soviet Union's own figures and neutral
estimates, the Soviet Union had an additiona l standing army
of nearly I ,000,000 men.

So on her Chinese border Japan faced about nine times
her own army strength in man power and on her Soviet
border about five times her own strength in armed man
power. China and the Soviet Union were potentially in a
military alliance. Japan faced about 14 times her own
stre,n gth in combined. hostile forces.
Meanwhile America and Britain were unfriendly and
diplomatically on the side of the Soviets. But during this
critical period, from 1933 to 1937, Japan increased her army
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by only 27,000 men. Japan's army remained one of the
smallest among world powers, while her two neighbors, the
most militaristic in the world in numbers of troops, strained
every resource to increase their strength month by month.
Facts and Generalities

Each of the foregoing statements can be substantiated.
Such facts do not bear out the sensational charges, in American newspapers eager for aU. S. Soviet alliance, that Japan's
policy has been one of " mad dog militarism" challenging
America and the rest of the world . No other nation in history, facing for years a situation so critical, has kept its
armed forces so small in relation to the potential threat of
such a combination of power at its very borders.

It is very significant that newspapers which constantly
refer to Japan's creation of a "mighty military machine"
very carefully avoid stating the exact size of that "mighty
military machine." The same papers are equally careful,
in their sensationalism about helpless China being jumped
on by a "foe armed to the teeth," to avoid comparing the
size of Japan's army prior to the fighting with the size of
China's forces.
A hate campaign which must rely on concealment of
important facts must be weak from the standpoint of specific
evidence. The drive to stir needless hatred of Japan bears
all the indications of being a repetition of the 1917 war
propaganda technique.
The question for thinking Ame.r icans is this: Will our
next conflict be a bona fide defence of this country against
a real enemy or a framed-up conflict to gratify propaganda
liars here at home?

If there is any sound reason for us to view Japan as an
enemy, the war-mongers have not yet produced it. Instead,
their concealment of so many known particulars plus their
(35]

Rarely
Mentioned ...
It is rarely mentioned that in 1922
J apan voluntarily returned to C hina
Shantung concessions won from Ge rmany in the World War.

The hate

campaign

call s for

against

J apan

avoid in g all facts wh ich might subtract from t he publicity picture of
j apan as fiercely grabbing everything
in sight, madly bent on wo rld conquest.

sensationalizing of obvious hokum, plus the fact that ringleade.rs in the hate campaign are known Soviet sympathizers,
all tend to show that the drive to stir trouble with Japan
proceeds from the hope of getting America to fight for the
Soviets in Asia.
The Tanaka Memorial

Much publicity has been gtven m America to what is
called the Tanaka Memorial. This is allegedly a plan of
Japanese ambitions of conquest, beginning with China and
leading to wa r with Ame rica. It came to American attention through Chinese publicity sources, with a statement
that it was a scheme submitted to the Emperor of Japan by
an official named Tanaka.
There are many specific facts which do not bear out
charges that the Japanese are bent on conquest in the manner outlined in what Chinese assert to be the Tanaka
Memorial.
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Voluntarily, Japan returned to China in 1922 the Shantung properties won from Germany in the World War.
Japan's relatively small army, one-ninth the size of China's
prior to the present conflict, would hardly indicate ade.quate
preparation to fight China alone, not to mention America
and the rest of the world.
Japan's peace offer to China in January of 1938, with
a view to ending the present war, did not demand an inch of
Chinese territory. The main demand was that anti-Japanese
violence and agitation of the sort causing the massacre of
Japanese civilians at T ungchow be suppressed.

If the Japanese were looking for conflict with China,
as the Tanaka Memorial says, there were numerous provocations between 1927, the date Chinese claim the Tanaka
Memorial was drafted, and 1937, the date present fighting
began. In 1927, in fact, the British Government, now allied
with Moscow against Japan, appealed to Japan to send troops
to China to help defend British lives against Chiang Kaishek's anti-British drive. If japan wished to attack Chi na,
that was a splendid opportunity-with British approval. At
any time prior to 1937, Japan could have attacked Chiang
when he was less well equipped with imported foreign arms.
During years prior to 1937, too, Chinese militarists repeatedly sought Japanese aid, promising all sorts of concessions
in return for aid resulting in victory over other Chinese factions . These were refused by Japan.
Altogether, the evidence does not support the theory of
the Tanaka Memorial. There is no evidence that the J apanese fight on less provocation than America or any other
country. J apan's territorial gains per war have been no
more, when war came, than those of America, Britai n,
France, and other powers. So far as specific evidence goes,
there is no more reason to suppose the Japanese plan to attack us than there is to entertain the same suspicion respecting other nations.

Besides such external evidence, there are discrepancies
within the alleged memorial which tend to discredit it. On
page 1 it purports to describe an interview participated in by
Prince Aritomo Yamagata, Japanese statesman, after the
Nine Power Conference of 1922. But Yamagata was dead
at the time of the supposed interview, and was dead even
before the Nine Power Treaty was signed-a fact confirmable in the Encyclopaedia Britannica or any other standard
reference.
A "memorial" containing such absurdities may make
good publicity to se.e k entanglement of America abroad, but
it can hardly gain the credence of thinking people.

Red Plans for
W aron]apan
In this booklet Chinese reds te ll of
plans to start war on japan to "unify
China" and also regain Manchukuo.
On page 41 Mao Tse-tung, red chief,
says: " It is the immediate task of
China to regain all our lost territories."
This was published in
English in America two months before fighting began. Chinese reds did
not talk of war to regain Mongolia,
taken by Soviets in 1923. (See map
page 14). By calling for war on
japan, an anti-red nation , they could
count on favorable publicity in U. S.
papers.
Red publicity connections
a re so good here that any ally of
Moscow is called a victim of aggression, even if it announces in advance
its plan to attack-as in this case.
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Rarely Mentioned
U. S. papers eager to stir hatred of Japan carefully
avoid mentioning that Chiang Kai-shek came into power
in 1927 on a program of driving Americans and British
from China. He was then in an alliance with the reds. His
propaganda chief was Gusenbe.rg, lent by Moscow, who
used the Russian name Borodin. American men, women,
and children were wantonly slain then by the same Chinese
officials pleading friendship to get our aid now.

r39 i

Opium

When Chinese civil wars became chronic after the
World War, cultivation of opium was revived on a tremendous scale throughout China to raise funds for Chinese
militarists. Anti-opium edicts were now and then announced, but opium remained a chief source of official
revenue over most of China.
Above picture was taken about seve,n miles from the
writer's home near F oochow, China, in 1932.¥ It shows
poppies planted by public orders of Fang Shun-tao, then No.
1 Chinese official there. U. S. papers seeking trouble with
Japan avoid such facts, shouting Japanese "introduce"
opium into China. In territory of Chinese population they
control, Japanese require licenses for opium shops. British
in Singapore and other British territories of Chinese population have the same requirement, which U. S. hate campaigners against Japan don't mention. Both British and
Japanese adopted licensing system for Chinese after futile
suppression efforts.
*See Ch. V III , Ways Tbat Are Dark- Tbe Trutb About Cbiua, by Ralp h
Townsend. 1933. In bookstores, li braries, or from G. P. Putn am's Sons, Publishers, 2 West 45th St., ·ew York City, price ~3 . 00.
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Night Maneuvers by Tokio Soldiers, in
~
Area Forbidden by Treaty, Started
Fighting Which Has tasted a Year
The Sino-japanese tllar is in its :second ,year, with Chinese resistance more stubborn than it has e"er
Jack Fader, who has lra\Jeled in the Far Ea!.l, will tell in detail the little
incidenb rvhic/t started the war, and JtJill attempt to count the gains and loue.s in the Jir.sl year
of fighjing Information for the .series was gathered /rom private sources in the For Ea!.l and in Wa.sh·
inglon, as well as /rom preu Jisplaches.- The Editor.
....,

been. In this series of articles
~nown

~

-

BY JACK FOSTER

~

Scripps-Howard Staff Writer

On the night of July 7, 1937, a

body of Japanese troops was holding
manuevers on the sandy stretches
near Marco Polo Bridge, whose
~ white stone lions look indifferently
~ down at the murky Yungting River,
10 miles southwest of Peiping.
There was no honest reason why
they should be there, on Chinese
&Oil. The maneuvers had been going
~ on for over a week. They should
have ended days before. Furthermore, the Boxer Treaty strictly for~bade foreign troop movement~~ in
~ this area.
~ ..._ Neverti:J_el~s~ marching s.round in •

Photostat from San Francisco
News of july 13 , 1938.

It typifies

falsities by which needless trouble
is invited for us in Asia.

If such

misrepresentations

omitted

from

the

hate

were

campaign

there

would be no hate campaign. The
facts alone provide no occasion
for ill-will on our part.

Falsities Stirring Hate
It is very odd that so many newspapers repeat from
day to day hate-stirring falsities after conscientious persons
have called attention to errors.
Completely absurd is the second paragraph of the item
above. Article IX of the Boxer Protocol of 1901 expressly
provides that in the future foreign powers, including Japan,
would be privileged to keep troops in the area cited. The
text of this is readily available. What explains the misrepresentation?
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AMERICANS AND BRITISH
IN ATTACKS AT NANKING;
WARSHiPS THEN SHELL CITY AND RESCUE SOME FOREIGNERS;
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In 1927
Chiang Kai-shek' s party was in its first red alliance and
busy against British in China. Britain appealed to Japan
to send Japanese troops to help save British lives and property. Later Britain became a diplomatic ally of the Soviet
Union. Red publicity against Japan in America is designed
to draw America into the British-French-Soviet alliance
dominated by Soviets.
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BLAMES THE SOVIET
FOR EVEN'fS IN CHINA

Shanghai Say• 30 AmericCUI$
Arf Missing crt Nanking

<

SHANGHAI, Saturday, Mareb 2&
(!1').-A check-up· !rom all a.eoouDt.s
which had reached 8hangha1 up to
10 o'clock thl& morning lndleated
that thirty Americans were sUII UD·
accounted !or at Nanklnc.. It was
1mpoeslble to te!l their fate.
Hopes or ultimate rescue of those
alive, however, were brighter aa the
Cantonese leader bad changed his
attitude · under the threat of an·
other Anglo-American bombard·
ment.

British Envoy Here Declares
Reds Incite "Ignorant Coolies"
to "Violence and Pillage."

Special to The 'New York Times.

He Hints in Worcester Speech )
That Cantonese, Like Turks, Are
Using Bolshevism as a Tool. I
Special to TM 'New York Time•·
WORCESTER, Man., March 211.1t Charging that the €hlneae attack.e on
the Brltleh, American.. and other foreigners In Shanghai, Nanking and
other parts ot China are directly Inspired by the Russian Soviet Government, S1r Esme Howard, British Am·
bassador to the United States, In an
·address before the Metal Trades and
Employers' Association tonight, said
that the present trouble In China 'ltaa
the first step In a Bolehevlst plan t~
drive the British and all torelgnera
from China and ultimately effect a
Bolshevist revolution throughout the
world.
Sir Esme said that at all coeta
the British Government would defend
the Uvea, property and treaty rights
ot British nllllonals In China and that

I

WASHINGTON , March 211.-The
State Departm ent received a cable
tonight !rom Clarence E. Gau1a.
Consul General at Shanghai, atat·
lng that two shiploads or re!ugeea
f rom Nanking will arrive at Shanghai tomorrow.
According to the Consul at Nan·
king, many or the refugees are dee·
tltute and will require aselstance.

REFUGEES SPEEDING
FROM DANGER ZONE
NV. t;i'P(e5, NAif. 2 f,, ~.,

Group That Left Nanking Before
Latest Outbreak Arrives
Safely at Shanghai.
Sp~ c ial

to Tile New York Time•.

WASHINGTON, March 211.-The safe
' a rriva l at Sha.nghal of forty-nine

Compare Britain's official attitude toward reds in 1927,
when British were their target, with Britain's attitude in
1937-38 when Japanese have been the target of reds.
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rf{•Y, /IMfS Mil /(, 1 (p I '!Cf ..< .,_ PA & 1: J
Tut ot tlae Message bJ Admiral Hough at Nt~t~kin,
Which Re1ulted in tlae Decision to Shell tlae City
I

B7 FREDEIUCK MOORE.
Copyrldlt, lnJ, b)' Tbe Mew rork '1'1- CoaiJIUI7,
Specl&l Cat>le Lo TBa N8W To&JI Tl ....

SHANGHAI, :March 26.-Tht message from Rear Aclmlnl B.
H. Hough, at Nankiag, to Admiral C. S. Williams, CommBD4er-ln~
Chief at Shanghai, which renltecl in the third ultimatum and the
liberation of the foreignera follows:
1 do not believe that lbe det.Jie of the altuaUon are eomptetety
understood by the Comat&IU1er-ID·Ohlet.
1 agree with the Brttleb HDior officer preeeDt that UDlea our
nattona.le are promptly re.l_.ed, and dl!llveNd at lbe B11D4. 4rUUc
acUon muet be taken In order to ave tbe line of tboH ....,.,.,. Ia
tbe city. Tbere are wounded aahore who eannot NOlin attaUoD aD4
abould not be D'lflectecl furUltr. lQcludln~ the Brttlab OODaul a..raL
I beUeve that radse.l acUoD woWcl P~WVYe Una aD4 tlu1Jlu 411&7
would de!•t tbl.l ~bllll7.
I believe that the abWlla« of mlllt&r7 palata, ayql4lq l1lJ1U'J' to tile
civil 'POPUlace aa much u poactbl., would at tbl.I .Ume haYe acen.t
effect upon the port aa4 aloq the rlYer.
I have 1uet rec.Jv.. lUI ......Sve aa4 hulolent reply tram U.. ~
army commander.
I conalcler that It ooacnte actloa Ia not takm ftftnly &84 . _ . .
dlately here lbe Uvea ol tba rematAinc BrltJ•h &Del Amerlcau ..,- be
toat and all Brltilh uad AmerSOana muat promptlY ·~ the
Yan~&e Valley In order to ave thelr lives.
Unlea otherwt.e lutnl*cl &Del IUtl~A the .ttuaU. ra4loaJl1
chanKea 1 wtti 1otDUY wiU. \be British late this attenaooa sbell . the
aallent military petnta allcl mllltary yamea.
I am aendln« a final 'WIU'DlD« by a ChiD... ID11It.ar7 orclell7.
Cb&DR K&l-ahek'• arrival 111 problemaUc&l ab4 we do DOt ~
tb&t under the8e oondlu- be 1s . , _ . enou,rb to odlltrol the llltqaUoD
even If be ao duirea er abovld arrtn 1D Ume to ave the ,....,.,..,
llve8.
BOVOK.

s,..,

to ~ ,.., rM•

n.ee.

WASHINGTON, Mardi 25 -Admiral C. 8.

Wi~Uaaw'a

Rear Admiral Hou.rh'a meaaap asking permiAion to sbell
follows:
Uae your owu

Ju«KJM~~t

~

rep})' to

lfaaldbr

1D hlndlln« the altuatlon.
WJTliA~

The British Conunande~ln-Chlef NDt a similar J11US1110 to tM
commanding officer of tile c:raiMr Emerald at NanldJis.

Facing a similar situation, America's attitude m 1927
was as stern as Japan's in 1937.
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Red Publicity Power
Readers who seek a balanced perspective of foreign
affairs will do well to ponder all implications of the following facts:
When Bolivia and Paraguay were warring not long
ago, not a single American paper sought to name the aggressor. There were no mass meetings- no protests. Why?
The distinction of that war was that neither side was an
ally of Moscow. It is only in conflicts between red and
anti-red forces, as in China and in Spain now-that our
press is suddenly interested in naming the "aggressor". The
"aggressor" is always the anti-red side. There was no
political or publicity capital for reds in the Bolivia-Paraguay
war. Hence lack of sensationalism concerning it here.
U. S. papers kept quiet during years of pro-red Me.xico' s closing of churches and expulsions of priests, but
raised a mighty wail over far less restrictive religious measure.s in anti-red nations.
Confiscation of hundreds of million dollars worth of
U. S. oil and other properties by pro-red Mexico stirred very
little objection in most U. S. papers. But temporary occupation of obscure American mission property by Japanese
in China-worth at most a few hundred dollars-stirred
violent blasts of fury. Japan is an anti-red nation.
There was more furore in Washington over news
later that Mexico was selling the oil to Japan and Germany
- anti-red nations-than there had been over Mexico's confiscation of it from American owners. U. S. criticism of the
oil seizure became crusty only after learning who'd get
the oil.
The minute France began to go red in a big way under
Leon Blum two years ago, U. S. papers began to praise

France to the skies, though France had done nothing else
to account for this mysterious sudden torrent of American
press e,ulogies. Certainly France had come no nearer paying long-standing debts. Meanwhile U. S. papers carefully
avoid mentioning that Japan, an anti-red nation, is the only
world power to pay all debts to us at all times, with never
a dollar of default or delay. France is an ally of Moscow.
Japan's bombing of the Panay was sensationalized
with all sorts of war talk. China's equivalent bombing of
the S. S. Hoover at sea, and China's bombing of the International Settlement at Shanghai, killing and injuring Americans, we,re neatly hushed up. China is an ally of Moscow.
Nothing much was said in America about Austria's
debt as long as it was Austria's debt. The moment Austria
was merged with Germany and the debt could be charged
to Germany, an anti-red nation, U. S. papers let loose a
mighty howl. Yet the amount owed, and the principle involved, were the same in both cases.
Sensationalism to involve America in Asia claims the
issue there is "democracy". But neither Japan nor China
is a democracy. There was never a popular election in
China during all the 4,000 years of that country's history.
Chiang Kai-shek, present dictator, got his power by fighting
for it. Japan, a constitutional monarchy much similar to
that of England, with control over taxes and appropriations
by an elected Diet, is not a democracy in the correct sense
of the word. Nor is Japan in any sense fascistic, having
no dictator and retaining control of finances and most other
agencie.s of government by elected representatives.
Papers seeking to entangle America in Asia avoid
calling Chiang Kai-shek a dictator-calling him "generalissimo"-which conceals the fact that China is the world's
second severest dictatorship.

Affairs are not yet ripe in America to praise the Soviet
Union direct in average papers. Instead, they praise. every
m ilitary and diplomatic ally of the Soviet Union. If U. S.
backing can be achieved for Moscow's allies, that is nearly
as good as direct backing for Moscow. Hence. the avoidance
of "red" applied to Moscow allies and substitution of
" democracy"-which sounds better to American ears.
Readers may judge for themselves the extent to which
Ame.rican papers play this publicity game deliberately or
as dupes of a publicity machine such as was created to drag
us into war in Europe in 1917.
"Territorial aggression" is not a real issue, in evidence
of which papers attacking Japan on that point avoid mentioning the Soviets' 1923 grab of Mongolia. American
papers backed Japan, whatever territory Japan took, as long
as Japan was an opponent of the Czar, then turned antiJapanese after 191 7-as soon as Japan was viewed by
strong forces here as an opponent of the "New Russia."
Anything which can be construed as an "atrocity" is
sensationalized regarding all anti-red nations-and concealed or played down regarding any ally of Moscow.
Britain's recent bombings of Indian civilian villages and
France's bombings of North African villages are not discussed in average U. S. papers. England and France are
allied with Moscow. Chiang Kai-shek killed thousands of
Chinese civilians in his civil wars. Doubtless his bombings
were. not intended to do so. But as in Japan's case, any
air attack on military objectives in crowded China brings
serious civilian tolls. The point is that the same events
headlined against anti-reds are. kept quiet if involving any
Moscow ally.
Such publicity examples reveal trends in current sensationalism. Linkage with alien politics is plain. It is indeed a spectacle of hypocrisy that those seeking to embroil
us abroad refer to principles of "civilization" and "honor",
when their efforts are based so largely upon deception and
outright lying.
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America's P osition
In poin ting out t hat we have no cause to hate 1apan,
the re is no intended suggestion th a t any body in America
shoul d be p ro-1apanese.
Being pro-anything in foreign strife invites trouble.
Our partisanism either way is unwarranted. There has been
nothing in Japan's relations with us to deserve our hatred
of Japan. Nor has there been anything in China's relations
with us to deserve. our support of China.

Past favors to China brought us no thanks, as proved
by repeated anti-American campaigns led by C hinese officials for political motives. T hey now plead all sorts of
esteem for us- now t hat t hey want our aid again. But it
was this same group of Chinese who came into power on an
anti-American program, when that was expedient in 1927.
Talk of "aiding democracy" and "resisting dictatorship"
was proved publicity bait by schemers to entangle us for
their own aims in the past. It would be so again if Americans once more succumbed to the same bait. It is well to
remember that both after 1898 and 1918 we were scorned
and hated by the people our interv:e.n tion was allegedly designed to aid. And it is particularly absurd to talk of "aiding democracy" in China, where democracy neve.r existed.

America is now in t he pecul ia rl y fortunate position of
having no coun try as an enemy. W hy spoi l t hi s good fort une? On a basis of facts , as dist inct from mi nority hate
propaganda, we have no cause to qu a rrel with the 1apanese .
They want our good wi ll. By avoiding partisanism we can
keep on reasona bly friendly te rms with both Chinese and
1apanese. D'oing so wi ll be to our advantage and contribute to world stabi lization. Very pl ainly, the choice for
cordial relations is ours.

We Have No Enemies in Asia!
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